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LEGISLATION
NEW YORK ADOPTS THE "FICTITIOUS PAYEE ACT"
At the 1960 session of the legislature, New York adopted the
"Fictitious Payee Act," 1 which amends Section 28(3) of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law. The amended section provides that an
instrument shall be payable to bearer:
When it is payable to the order of a fictitious person, or a non-existing
person, or an existing person not intended to have any interest in it, and any
such fact was known to the person making it so payable, or known to his
employee or other agent who supplied the name of such payee.2
This provision is similar in part to Section 3-405 of the Uniform
Commercial Code 3 and Section 7(3) of the English Bills of Ex-
change Act.4 Upon the recommendation of the American Bankers
Association 5 it has been enacted to date in twenty-one states.6
I The term "Fictitious Payee Act" is merely descriptive of the instant
amendment, and does not signify a codified act such as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. See Note, The Impostor Payee, or What's in a Name?,
33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 105, 115 (1958).2N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR. LAW §28(3) (Supp. 1960). The italicization
signifies the extent of the amendment. The amendment is at variance with
UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §9(3). A similar amendment
to an Illinois statute was treated in Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(1) (b) (c).
445 & 46 Vict. c. 61, § 7(3), at 368 (1882) (intent of drawer not a
factor).
5 See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 710 (1943).6 ALA. CODE tit. 39, § 13(3) (1958); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-409(3)(1956) ; ARx. STAT. ANN. § 68-109(3) (1947) ; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3090(3) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. §674.11(3) (Supp. 1960); GA. CODE ANN. §14-209(3)
(Supp. 1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. §27-109(3) (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 98, §29(3) (Smith-Hurd 1935); IOWA CODE ANN. §541.9(3) (Supp.
1960); LA. REy. STAT. §7:9(3) (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. §19.51(3)
(1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. §335.052(3) (Supp. 1960); Mo. ANN. STAT.§401.009(3) (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §55-209(3) (1947); N. M.
STAT. ANN. §50-1-9(3) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §25-15(3) (1953);
ORE. REv. STAT. §71.009(3) (1953) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §44-1-10(3) (1953) ;
VA. CODE ANN. §6-361(3) (Supp. 1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4321(c)(1955); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §13-295(3) (1957).
The Uniform Commercial Code, which contains provisions similar to the
"Fictitious Payee Act" is presently in effect in four states. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §42a-3-405(1) (b) (c) (1960); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.3-405(1)(b)(c) (Supp. 1961); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, §3-405(1)(b)(c)(Spec. Supp. 1958) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §3-405(1)(b)(c) (1954).
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Payroll Padding and Prior Law
The instant amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Law was
enacted with a view toward shifting the loss in cases of payroll
padding.7
Payroll padding usually occurs in the following classic manner:
A, a trusted employee of B, prepares a payroll list which includes
names of persons represented to be employees of B. In reality, no
such persons exist, but this fact is not known to B. B then draws
checks payable to the supposed employees. The checks are inter-
cepted and indorsed in the name of the ostensible payees by A.
Subsequently, the fraud is discovered and B commences an action
against the drawee bank for the purpose of having his account re-
credited in the amount of the bogus checks. The question then
presented is who, as between drawer (B) and drawee (the bank),
shall bear the loss. 8
Under prior law, the right of a depositor to have his account
recredited depended upon whether or not the bank had acted accord-
ing to his directions." This, in turn, depended upon his intentions
when drawing the check. If he knew that the named payee was a
fictitious or non-existing person, the check, according to the terms of
the then-existing section 28(3), was considered bearer paper.10 As
such, title to the instrument passed by delivery, and it was not
necessary for the bank to inquire into the genuineness of the in-
dorsement." On the other hand, if the drawer were not aware
of the fictitious nature of the payee, his intent that there should
be a real payee controlled. Hence, the duty devolved upon the bank
to pay only upon the indorsement of the named payee.' 2 In this
See N.Y. LEGisLrvE ANNuAL 156-57 (1960).
s See, e.g., City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64,
184 N.E. 495 (1933); Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E.
371 (1891).
9 "The relation existing between a bank and a depositor being that of
debtor and creditor, the bank can justify a payment on the depositor's -account
only upon the actual direction of the depositor." Critten v. Chemical Nat'l
Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 224, 63 N.E. 969, 970 (1902).
10 The statute "applies only to paper put into circulation by the maker with
knowledge that the name of the payee does not represent a real person. The
maker's intentio, is the conxtrolling consideration which determines the character
of such paper. It cannot be treated as payable to bearer unless the maker
knows the payee to be fictitious and actually intends to make the paper payable
to a fictitious person." Shipman v. Bank of New York, supra note 8, at
330, 27 N.E. at 374 (emphasis added).
11 N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR. LAW § 60; UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 30. In fact, if the note is payable to a fictitious payee "the name
of the payee need not be indorsed thereon before negotiation." Irving Nat'l
Bank v. Alley, 79 N.Y. 536, 540 (1880).
12-Caledonian Ins. Co. v. National City Bank, 208 App. Div. 83, 203 N.Y.
Supp. 83 (1st Dep't 1924). See note 8 supra.
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case, therefore, payment to any other than the nimed payee was a
misdirection of the depositor-drawer's funds for which the bank was
liable.
The payroll cases were included in this latter category, and absent
any special defense,13 the bank was bound to make good the loss.-
Transfer of Intent
As is apparent from the above, the difficulty inherefit in the
prior law was that the determination of whether the paper issued
was payable to order or to bearer depended upon the subjective
intent of the drawer. As a result, there were some attempts made
to impute the intent of the employee to the employer for the benefit
of the holder in due course.
A leading case propounding this theory was Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y v. National Bank of Commerce,14 in which it was held
that an agent's khowledge of the fictitious character of the payee was
the knowledge of the drawer of the check. This decision drew what
would seem to be just criticism 15 in view of the general principle
that a principal is not liable for the fraudulent acts of an agent which
are outside his scope of employment.1 6
The traditional principal-agent rule 17 was stated in City of New
York v. Bronx County Trust Co.,18 wherein the court determined
that the plaintiff's employees "were not acting within the scope of
Is "No bank shall be liable to a depositor for the payment by it of a
forged or raised check, unless within one year after the return to the
depositor of the voucher of such payment, such depositor shall notify the
bank that the check so paid was forged or raised." N.Y. NEGO'TmI.E lxsni.
LAW § 326. See also N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INs. LAw § 43 (Supp. 1960).
On the theory of estoppel due to negligence, see generally, Arant, Forged
Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to His Bank, 31 YALE L.J. 598, 612
(1922); Britton, Negligence in the Law of Bills and Notes, 24 COLUm. L.
REv. 695 (1924).
14 181 S.W. 1176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916), overruled by American Sash &
Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034 (1932),
33 CoLum. L. Rxv. 910 (1933).i5 See BRANNAN, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW 333 (7th ed. 1948).
1s When an agent commits such a fraud, the presumption is that no com-
munication, either express or constructive, has been made with the principal,
since the very perpetration of the fraud necessitates secrecy. 2 PomExoY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 675 (5th ed. 1941). See 2 MECHEm, AGENCY § 2001
(2d ed. 1914) for the view that a principal is not liable for the riminal acts
of his employee. But see Phillips v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 140 N.Y. 556,
35 N.E. 982 (1894), in which the bank was held liable for the acts of its
cashier; but note that the cashier had express authority to issue checks, and
the element of estoppel appeared in the case.
17 See, e.g., Grand Lodge of Kansas, A.O.U.W. v. State Bank, 92 Kan. 876,
142 Pac. 974 (1914); American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co.,
supra note 14.
18 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 495 (1933).
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their duties [in supplying the names], and their knowledge [that
the payees were fictitious] was not the knowledge of the city." 19
This approach, however, has now been obviated by the recent
amendment to Section 28(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Under this amendment, it is no longer necessary to ascertain the
intent of the employer-drawer in the payroll cases; it is sufficient
for the employee supplying the name of the payee to know that the
check is payable "to the order of a fictitious person, or a non-
existing person, or an existing person not intended to have any
interest in it." 20
Section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code Distinguished
The "Fictitious Payee Act," as adopted in New York, differs
from Section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code in three
particulars.
(A) Requirement of Indorsement. Section 28(3), as amended,
makes any instrument payable to a fictitious payee bearer paper.
As such, no indorsement is needed to pass title, since bearer paper
is negotiable by delivery.21 Section 3-405 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, on the other hand, requires an indorsement for nego-
tiation,22 since such paper is, on its face, order paper. However,
the Code comment obviates the apparent restrictions of this require-
ment by providing that anyone-"first thief, second impostor or third
murderer"-can validly indorse in the name of the ostensible payee.28
What, then, is the purpose of the indorsement?
It would seem that the reason lies in the fact that a recipient
of what outwardly appears to be order paper should require a
regular chain of indorsements, the absence of which might bear on
his ability to claim the position of holder in due course.24 In actual-
ity, however, the distinction between the two sections appears
academic, since the person who causes such an instrument to be
issued would invariably indorse in the name of the ostensible payee,
if only to give the instrument an appearance of regularity and thus
prevent his fraud from prematurely coming to light.
(B) Confusing Terminology. During the time in which
section 28(3) has been in existence, the terms "fictitious" and "non-
19 Id. at 70, 184 N.E. at 497.20 N.Y. NEGOTImLE INsTR. LAW § 28(3) (Supp. 1960).
21 N.Y. NEGOTIABLE Ixsm. LAW § 60; UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 30.22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405, comment 1.
23 Iid.
24 In order to be classified as a holder in due course under the statutes,
one must take without "notice of any infirmity in the instrument. . . ."
N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INsTR. LAW §91(4); UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 52(4).
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existent" included therein caused some difficulty in construction.
Under this section, it is the intent of the drawer that the named
payee shall have no interest in the instrument, rather than the
fictitiousness or non-existence of the payee which makes the in-
strument bearer paper. Thus, a payee in a given case, though in
fact a real person, may be considered fictitious within the meaning
of the statute if the intent is that he shall have no interest in the
instrument. On the other hand, a check drawn to the order of a
person who, unknown to the drawer, is not in existence, is non-
negotiable, since the only person who could transfer title is not in
esse. If, however, the non-existence of the payee is known to the
drawer, the instrument is payable to hearer. The view has there-
fore been expressed that a person may be considered a "real" person
within the statute though he is in actuality non-existent.25
The Code drafters, recognizing that the language of section
28(3) was confusing,26 eliminated it from their official text. The
confusion was also noted by the New York Law Revision Commission
in its consideration of the Code,27 but its observation seems not to
have influenced the legislature when the instant amendment was
adopted. As a result, the statute is now redundant since it first
mentions the terms "fictitious" and "non-existent" which have been
judicially defined in terms of intent,28 and then expressly mentions
persons "not intended to have any interest", which would necessarily
seem to include the other two categories.
(C) The Impostor Payee. In the general area of imposture,
there occurs a situation giving rise to what is known as the "impostor
rule", a seeming exception to the normal application of section
28(3) .2 9  This situation is exemplified in the following manner:
A represents himself as someone else in a face-to-face transaction
with B, the drawer of the check. B then draws the check to A
under his assumed name. Subsequently, A indorses in the assumed
name and appropriates the proceeds of the check to his own use.
In an action to recover the amount thus paid to the impostor, the
drawer cannot recover, since it is generally held that it was the
intent of the drawer to pay the check to the person"° before him
25 BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTEs § 149, at 705 (1943).
26 See authority cited note 22 supra.
27 1955 LEG. Doc. No. 65(D), N.Y. LAw REVISION CoiimissioN REP.
242 (1955).
28 See Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 330, 27 N.E. 371,
374 (1891). Perhaps the confusion would be eliminated if the amendment
provided that an instrument would be payable to bearer when it is payable
to the order of a payee not intended to have any interest in it and any such
fact was known to the person making it so payable, or known to his employee
or other agent who supplied the name of such payee.
29 Comment, The Fictitiouts Payee and the UCC-The Demise of a Ghost,
18 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 285 (1951).
30 "Although one may be deceived as to the name of the man with whom he
[ "VOL. 35
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rather than to the assumed personality. This situation is dis-
tinguished from one in which the impostor obtains the check through
mail transactions rather than in a face-to-face encounter. In the
former case, it is generally held that the drawer may recover, since
his intent was to pay to the person named rather than the recipient
of the check.3 1
The above distinction and its resultant placing of loss is abolished
by the Code provisions, the drafters assuming that in the mail cases,
the maker or drawer believes, in much the same fashion as the
face-to-face imposture, that the named person and the person receiving
the instrument are one and the same. 32
New York, however, rejects this rigid Code rule and retains
the distinction, reasoning that the flexible rule of the case law in this
state makes it "possible to place the loss on the party who failed
to take businesslike precautions." 33
Bills of Exchange Act Distinguished
The English Bills of Exchange Act provides that "where the
payee is a fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated
as payable to bearer." 3 4 It is unlike sections 28(3) and 3-405 in
that it omits any reference to the intent of the drawer, and thus
eliminates the element of subjectivity which has been the bane of
the American statutes.
is dealing, if he dealt with and intended to deal with the visible person before
him the check may properly be indorsed by the impostor." Halsey v. Bank
of New York & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 139, 200 N.E. 671, 673 (1936).
See also Holub-Dusha Co. v. Germania Bank, 164 App. Div. 279, 149 N.Y.
Supp. 775 (1st Dep't 1914) ; First Nat1 Bank v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank,
49 App. Div. 349, 63 N.Y. Supp. 58 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 170 N.Y. 88,
62 N.E. 1089 (1902). But see Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399,
10 N.E.2d 457 (1937), in which the court states that "physical presence is ...
'often a surer means of identification' than a designated name . . . but . . .
only where physical presence is combined with antecedent dealings and in-
tention 'to deal with the visible person.'" Id. at 411, 10 N.E.2d at 463
(emphasis added). See also Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 48 MIcH. L. Rmv. 255, 286 (1950), where the
author suggests that the dealings between an impostor and a drawer indicate
the carelesssness of the latter, on whom the loss should fall.
31 See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 181, 186 N.E.
436 (1933) (impostor obtained a draft by sending a stolen savings bank book
to the bank); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y.
Supp. 1017 (1st Dep't 1911), af'd, 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1134 (1914)
(impostor "sold" a claim to his salary to a bank through the mail).32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405, comment 2.
33N.Y. LAw REVIsIoN CoMmissIoN RuI . 409 (1956). For an analysis of
the role played by the element of negligence in impostor cases and the
resultant allocation of loss, see Abel, The Impostor Payee: Or, Rhode Island
Was Right: I, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 157, 187-99.
34 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61, § 7(3), at 368 (1882).
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Under the Bills of Exchange Act, the instrument would be
payable to bearer in any case where the named payee was non-
existent as that word is commonly understood,8 5 regardless of the
drawer's intent at the time of drawing. If the payee is a real person
to the knowledge of the drawer, however, the instrument is regarded
as order paper."6 Thus, the nature of an instrument is determined
by the existence or non-existence of the payee instead of the intent
of the drawer-a view more conducive to the free flow of commercial
paper.
The Scope of Section 28(3)
The amendment to section 28(3) provides that an instrument
shall be designated bearer paper when the "employee or other agent"
supplying the names of the payees knows that they will not have any
interest in the instrument. This provision, therefore, although
expanding the fictitious payee rule, defines a limitation as well. In
a case, for instance, where the person supplying the names is not
such "employee or other agent" the intent of the employer would
seem to be the only controlling factor.3 7
Section 28(3), as amended, effects no change in the imposition
of loss in cases where an employee forges his employer's name as
the drawer or maker of an instrument.3 8 This is evident from the
fact that the employee has no authorization to sign his employer's
name, and the instrument is a legal nullity. Nor is the liability of
the drawer affected where an incomplete instrument is stolen from
the employer before delivery.3 9
With reference to the language of the instant amendment, it
may be noted that it is not framed in terms so definite as to preclude
judicial interpretation. There is room for the courts to decide
whether a person may be classified as an "employee or other agent"
within the meaning of the statute, and what constitutes the act of
"supplying" the name of a payee.40
s5Clutton v. Attenborough, [1897] A.C. 90.
36Vinden v. Hughes, [1905] 1 K.B. 795.
s7 Cf. Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N.Y. 26, 85 N.E.
829 (1908).
s8 N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR. LAW § 42; UnnIOms NEGOTIALE INSTRUmENTS
LAW § 23. See also Sullivan v. Foote, 120 N.Y. Supp. 61 (App. T. 1909).
Note, however, that the acceptor may nevertheless be held liable on such a
note. N.Y. NEGOTIABU INsm. LAW § 112; UNrFORM NaOriABLE INSTRUmENTS
LAW § 62.39 N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTR. LAW § 34; UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 15.
40 Note, however, that N.Y. NEGOTABLE INST. LAW § 28(3) also states
that the fictitiousness of the payee must be known to the person "making it
[the check] so payable." Under this definition it is therefore possible to have
liability imposed upon the drawer even when the person supplying him with
the names of the fictitious payees was not his employee -or agent. See Union
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Application of Forgery Rule Narrowed
It is a general rule that no title may pass through a forged
indorsement, 41 and any bank or person who makes payment over
such indorsement does so at his peril.4 2 The effect of section 28(3),
as amended, is to limit the number of cases which can fall under this
rule by eliminating the necessity for an indorsement in instances
where the employee has supplied names of fictitious payees. The act
of supplying names of fictitious payees is not per se forgery.43 The
irregularity occurs only when the employee signs in the name of the
payee with intent to defraud, and then transfers the instrument for
value.44
In limiting the application of this rule, the legislature has also
limited 'the liability of banking institutions. The rationale of the
amendment is that an employer is better able to guard against fraud
in the fictitious payee area than is the bank.45 Be that as it may,
it is significant that the loss in these cases is occasioned not by the
fact that the payees were fictitious or non-existent, but by the fact
that the instrument was indorsed by an unauthorized person, and
such lack of authorization was not discovered by the bank.
The effect of this abridgment of the forgery rule does not seem
to curtail the criminal liability of the faithless employee in any way.48
This is true despite the fact that in legal effect the employee's
indorsement is not necessary to transfer title to the instrument. .The
reason for this distinction is twofold: (a) criminally, the employee's
intent to defraud by use of a spurious instrument which he caused
to be made and by which he illegally obtained funds controls;
4
T
Bank & Trust Co. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 8 Cal. 2d 303, 65 P.2d 355(1937). In that case one Williams, possessed of illegally obtained commercial
paper, exchanged it for cashiers' checks which were made payable to persons
designated by him but not intended to have any interest in them. The court,
duly noting that Williams was not an agent or employee of the bank and
had no authority to sign any cashiers' checks, held, nevertheless, that he was
the "real" drawer and, therefore, the "person making it so payable." Hence,
it would seem that judicial interpretation may expand the scope of § 28(3) in
accord with the exigencies of the moment. But see Seaboard Nat'l Bank v.
Bank of America, supra note 37.
41 N.Y. NEGOTIADLE INsTm. LAW § 42; UNnFORM NEGom.ABrU INsTRUMENTS
LAW § 23. See also Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Bank of America, supra note 37;
Stein v. Empire Trust Co., 148 App. Div. 850, 133 N.Y. Supp. 517 (1st
Dep't 1912).42 Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 327, 27 N.E. 371, 372(1891).
43 See DeRose v. People, 64 Colo. 332, 171 Pac. 359 (1918).
4 N.Y. PEr. LAW § 884(4) (6). See also 6 U. CHr. L. REv. 700, 703-04(1939).
4 5 See N.Y. LEGISLATIVE ANNIUAL 136-37 (1960).
46 See N.Y. PEN. LAW §883; accord, UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-
405(2), comment 5.47N.Y. PmE. LAW §887(4) provides: "A person is guilty of forgery
1961 ]
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and (b) the legislative intent was to shift the civil liability from the
bank to the maker or drawer 48 rather than negating the employee's
criminal responsibility.49
Consequences of a Special Indorseinent
Cases in which a special indorsement is placed upon an in-
strument falling within the ambit of section 28(3) highlight a
somewhat anomalous situation. Consider the following: a check is
issued in a typical padded payroll case. It is then appropriated
by the employee who supplied the name of the sham payee, indorsed
with such name, and specially indorsed in turn, to the order of X
for value. Prior to the instant amendment, X would have no right
to the instrument, since he took through a forged indorsement and
thus could obtain no title.50 Now, however, X, if a holder in due
course, could enforce the instrument as bearer paper. But the
benefit thus conferred by the statute may be applied in favor of any
holder in due course. Therefore, if the instrument is subsequently
stolen by Z, who forges X's signature and presents it to a bank
for payment, 51 who, as between X and the bank, has title to the
instrument?
it would appear that title is in the bank. The reason for
this is that an instrument payable to a fictitious payee is considered
bearer paper on its face. 52  As such, a special indorsement has no
effect upon its negotiability by delivery.53  The instrument in legal
in the second degree who, with intent to defraud: .. .(4) causes or procures
to be made . . . any instrument . . . or evidence of debt or for the payment
of money. .. issued in a characteristic form or appearance by any corporation,
firm, association or individual whose name appears thereon .... ." See also
the dictum in International Union Bank v. National Sur. Co., 245 N.Y. 368,
157 N.E. 269 (1927), where the court stated that "throughout the sections of
the Penal Law of this State defining the crime of forgery in its various
degrees may be found at least by implication the legislative intent that the
crime of forgery includes the subscription or indorsement of an instrument,
by any name fictitious or genuine, 'under the pretense that such subscription
or indorsement is the act of another person of the same name, or of a
person not in existence' . . . or 'purporting to be the act of another."' Id.
at 372, 157 N.E. at 270.
48 The only purpose of the instant amendment was to reverse the decision
in City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 495,(1933). N.Y. LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 156 (1960).
49 Cf. 1955 LEG. Doc. No. 65 (D), N.Y. LAW REvIsIoiN Com2MssioN REP'.
247 (1955).
50 See authorities cited note 41 supra.
51 Cf. Comment, The Fictitious Payee and the UCC-The Demise of a
Ghost, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 290 (1951).
52 BRirroN, BILLS AND NoTs 697, 699 (1943).
53 N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INsTR. LAW § 70; UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 40. But see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-204, which reverses the
[ VOL. 35
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effect is payable to bearer; X is. not entitled to demand that his
signature alone transfer title, nor is Z's indorsement considered a
forgery for the purpose of transferring title. In sum, therefore, X,
who purchased what appeared to be an order instrument with its
attendant safeguards, is left to prosecute his remedy against a pos-
sibly insolvent thief-a risk he never intended to assume. Hence,
though the statute provides X with a benefit, this benefit is one which
may be removed as hastily as it was conferred.
Some Observations on Section 28(3)
(1) Section 28(3), as amended, does not expressly apply to
a case where the indorsee rather than the payee is fictitious. 54 But
in view of the fact that there seems to be no real difference between
a case where a named payee is not intended to have an interest in
the instrument and one in which an indorsee is similarly regarded,
it is probable that this section will extend to the latter case by
analogy.55
(2) The transfer of intent which is accomplished by the
instant amendment raises an interesting question with respect to the
effect of a change of intent after the instrument is drawn. Consider
the following: a drawer draws a check to a person who is intended
to have the benefit of it, and then, for some reason, the drawer
decides to give the same instrument to a person other than the
named payee. In this case, it would seem that the second person
may validly indorse.56 But suppose an agent in the normal course
of his duties supplies the name of a payee who is intended to have
the interest in the check. After it is drawn by the employer, how-
ever, the agent changes his mind and appropriates the instrument,
now intending the named payee to have no interest in. it. Query:
will the agent's subsequent intent suffice to make the instrument
bearer paper? 57  It probably will not, for two reasons: (a) in the
effect of the above sections by making the last indorsement controlling. See
also WHITNEY, MODENs COMmERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 268 (1958).
54 Cf. 1955 LEG. Doc. No. 65 (D), N.Y. LAW REvIsION CommslSioN REP.
245 (1955).
5 5 BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 336 (7th ed. 1948). See also
Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118 N.E.2d 464 (1954); Cohen v.
Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937).
56 BtrroIO, op. cit. supra note 52, at 696-97.
57 A related question is presented in a case where the concurrence of two
employees is needed to "supply" the name of the payee. In such a case,
if one of the two has a fraudulent intent not known to the other, will the
check be considered issued to a fictitious payee under the instant amendment?
See P. & G. Card & Paper Co. v. Fifth Nat'l Bank, 172 N.Y. Supp. 688
(Sup. Ct 1918), holding that in a case where countersignatures are required
to issue a check, the fraudulent intent of one of the signatories is enough
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first hypothetical, the drawer is the person who changed his intent,
whereas in the latter case the agent had no control over the drawing
of the check; (b) under a strict view, it may be argued that the
controlling intent is that existing at the time the instrument is
drawn58 and a subsequent intent, therefore, would be of no effect.
(3) The original purpose of the fictitious payee doctrine was
to give effect to the intent of the maker-employer. 59 The instant
amendment, however, gives effect to the intent of the employee,
and, as such, is inconsistent with the reason behind the establishment
of the doctrine.60
Conclusion
The "Fictitious Payee Act" imposes a type of absolute liability
on an employer for the criminal acts of his employee. It validates
a fraudulently procured instrument and places the resulting loss upon
the employer rather than upon the banking institution, thus making
such loss a cost of doing business.61 Its enactment seems to be
a clear concession to banking interests, and its rigid application may
result in inequity in particular cases where a non-negligent employer
is betrayed by a formerly faithful employee whom he had no reason
to suspect of wrongdoing.62
to make the instrument bearer paper. Contra, BRirrTO, op. cit. supra note 52,
at 714.
58 See 6 U. CHI. L. REv. 700, 704 (1939).
59 BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 52, at 697.
60 See 1960 Survey of New York Law, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1403, 1483
(1960).
61The instant amendment not only requires an employer to bear a loss
equal in amount to the fraudulently issued checks, but also makes it necessary
for him to get "a blanket or at least a schedule fidelity bond . . . to give
the protection against check fraud by employees for which an individual
fidelity bond on the authorized signing officer previously sufficed." Farnsworth,
Insurance Against Check Forgery, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 284, 306 (1960).
It must be noted, however, that the possibility of inequity in the padded
payroll cases may be a rare occurrence and may be overshadowed by the
act's contribution to the free flow of commercial paper.
62 "In commercial law, perhaps more than in any other field, Justice
Brandeis' famous dictum holds true: 'It is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right' To the banker and the
businessman litigation is a positive evil." Comment, The Fictitious Payee
and the UCC-The Demise of a Ghost, 18 U. CI. L. REv. 281, 286 (1951).
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